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1.  INTRODUCTION
The  increase  in  the  volume  of  international  migration  over  the  recent
decades has led to an unprecedented  increase  in financial  flows to labor-
exporting  countries. Indeed,  the flows  of workers'  remittances  increased  more
than fivefold  in real terms during  the 1970s  and 1980s--from  around  USS 5.6
billion  in 1969  to USS  33.8  billion  in 1990.1 The  magnitude  of these  flows  has
revived  the  well-known  debate  on external  transfers  in  the  economic  development
literature.  (e.g.  Bhagwati  (1977),  Bhagwati  and  Brecher  (1982),  de  Macedo  (1977)
and  Pereira (1983)). Migration  and remittances  have also  become  major  policy
issues  in the agendas  of both labor-sending  and labor-receiving  countries,  as
well as multilateral  organizations.
From the perspective  of labor-sending  countries,  there is a wide
range  of important  issues  related  to  external  migration  and  remittances.  These
include the determinants  of remittances,  the channels  through which these
remittances  flow,  and  the impact  of remittances  on the  sending  country. While
international  remittances  relax foreign  exchange  constraints  and enhance  the
potential  for capital  accumulation  and  growth (see  Solimano  (1990)),  they may
also  undermine  the  competitiveness  of export  industries,  thus  hurting  the  labor
sending  countries  in  other  directions  (the  Dutch  disease  effect). Furthermore,
the impact  of remittances  on labor-sending  countries  may also include  lower
morale and productivity  in the labor force left behind, or a conspicuous
consumption  behavior  in the  society.
1  IMF  figures  of  labor-related  remittances  for  38  labor-exporting  countries.-2-
In this paper we confine our attention to the manor determinants of
workers' remittances.  The theoretical and empirical literatures suggest two
broadly distinct but not necessarily irreconcilable sets of determinants.  The
first  consists  of  the  basic  determinants  of  savings,  the  demographic
characteristics of the  migrant labor  force and  other family  relations.  The other
set comprises relative prices  and special incentive policies  adopted in the
labor-sending  countries. 2 Except  for a few examples,  however,  (Glytsos and
Kateeli  (1986), Rocha  (1989)), previous empirical  work  finds a  significant
influence of the first set of determinants on remittances, while consistently
failing  to find  any significant effects  of macroeconomic variables and incentive
policies.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the flows of workers'
remittances in six major labor-exporting countries of North Africa and Europe:
Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia.3 The selection of
countries was guided by the availability of data on the stocks of workers and
population  abroad.  Labor-exporting  countries  usually  have  very  incomplete
information on the number of nationals abroad.  However, migration from these
North African and European countries is primarily directed to Western Europe,
where better data is available.  The paper is organized as follows:  section two
reviews briefly the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of
remittances  and  provides  a  synthesis  of  the  literature  that  suggest  a
parsimonious  yet  encompassing set of potential determinants.  Section three
2 Political  and  cultural  factors may  also  influence  significantly  the
volumes of remittances across countries and over time.
3  This analysis covers the period before the recent break-up of Yugoslavia.
Therefore,  for  the  remainder  of this  paper  Yugoslavia  is taken  to  be  the
political entity before 1991.-3-
examines  the  pattern  of  migration,  remittances,  and  their  potential  determinants
for each of the six countries. Section  four presents  and estimates  a fixed
effecta econometric  model using panel data from the above countries.  This
section  also contains  detailed  diagnostic  tests  and the interpretation  of the
results.  Finally, section five summarizes  the results and presents some
conclusions. The  appendix  provides  a detailed  description  of data  sources  and
construction.
2o  A REVIEW  OF THE  LITERATURE  ON INTERNATIONAL  WORKERS'  REMITTANCES
There  are two  main (not  necessarily  irreconcilable)  approaches  to
modelling  international  workers'  remittances  (IWR). One  approach  treats  IWR  as
an endogenous variable in the  decision making process on  migration and
remittances  within  the family. The  other  models  it as  a  transfer  of saving  from
one region to another.  Naturally,  the determinants  of IWR under the first
tradition are dominated  by family  relations,  while in the second approach
portfolio  considerations  are  emphasized. In  this section  we briefly  review  the
theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on workers'  remittances  (see  Eissa (1990)
for  a  detailed  survey  of the  literature).  The  ultimate  objective  of the  review
is  to develop  a synthesis  of  the  two  approaches,  which  can  be subsequently  used
to justify  an empirical  model  of IWR  determination.
2.1.  The  Endocenous  Miaration  Approach  to IWR
In the literature  that endogenizes  the migration decision,  the
ability  to remit  is  directly  linked  to  the  wage  received  in  the  host  country  and
the  migrant  saving  behavior,  among  other  factors.  This  suggests  a  sequential  (or
nested)  decision  process,  where an aggregate  level  of -avings  is determined-4-
before (or  simultaneously  with)  the share  to be remitted  to the home  country.
There  is  a  class  of models  that  centers  the  analysis  in  the  determination  of the
migrant  worker's  savings  function. In  these  - Ddels,  the  migrant  is seen  as the
traditional  macroeconomic  agent  maximizing  intertemporal  utility  to generate  a
savings-consumption  path, both at home and abroad (Djajic  (1989),  Djajic  and
Milbourne (1988)).  The migrant's  program  is more complex  than the standard
savings  program,  since  he needs  to account  for  information  on foreign  relative
prices,  wages  and  interest  rate  paths,  in  addition  to  his  length  of  stay  abroad.
Djajic  (1989)  utilizes  such  a  framework  to  generate  optimal  savings  rate  abroad
and commodity  and leisure  consumption  paths in the context  of guest worker
migration.
The  Djajic  (1989)  model  assumes  an institutionally  determined  length
of stay,  an assumption  found  to be inconsistent  with empirical  evidence  (e.g.
Swamy (1981),  OECD (1986)). Djajic  and  Milbourne  (1988)  relax  this assumption
by  examining  the  joint  optimal  determination  of  the  length  of  stay  abroad  and  the
savings rate.  Other extensions  of the model emphasize  the  socioeconomic
background  of the  migrant  (Kumcu  (1989)).
There  is  another  class  of  models  that  maintain  the  endogeneity  of  the
migration decision, but treat remittances  as an intertemporal  contractual
agreement  between  the  migrant  and  his  family. The  exact  terms  of the contract
are defined  by the relative  bargaining  powers  of the parties  involved. Stark
(1980,82,83,84,85b,87a))  is the main contributor  to this literature.  He
considers  the family  contract  as a risk-sharing  arrangement  between  the  family
and  the  migrant  which  compensates  for  the  prevalent  lack  of  insurance  markets  in
developing  countries,  particularly  in  rural  regions.  He  further  argues  that  this
contract  is  Pareto  optimal  and  hence  self-enforcing.  The  benefit  for  the  migrantin  guaranteed  income  during  cyclical  down-turns.  The  benefit  for  the  family  is
an improved  risk-return  frontier,  such  that it  can  take  on riskier  investments
(e.g.  farm mechanization).  Lucas and  Stark (1984)  explore  altruism  and  self-
interest as elements in the remittance  contract and Chaney (1986)  models
remittances  as  intra-family  resource  transfers  in  the  context  of a  Becker's  type
family  production  function  framework.  Chaney's  model  highlights  the  role  of  the
migrant's  socio-economic  status  in  influencing  the  behavior  of hid  remittances.
One  of the  major  implications  of this  second  approach  is  that  there
is a minimum level  of "required"  remittances  determined  by the terms  of the
contract  between  the  migrant  and  his  family. Empirical  evidence  show  that  this
fraction  of  remittances  is  not  likely  to  be  affected  by incentive  policies  in  the
labor-sending  country  such  as  preferential  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates,  the
permission  to  maintain  foreign  exchange  accounts,  and  land  purchase  arrangements
(e.g.  Swamy  (1981),  Bhat (1981)  and  Straubhaar  (1986)).  Following  the  same  line
of  thought,  Glytsos  (1988)  provides  an  explicit  formulation  for  this  contract  by
specifying  the  minimum  or "required"  level  of remittances  to be at least  equal
to  the  difference  between  the  family  average  income  and  the  average  income  of  the
community. Furthermore,  the  ability  of the  family  to extract  a  higher  level  of
remittances  than the  income  differential  depends on the family's relative
bargaining  power.
The above  literature  suggests  an empirical  framework  that includes
as major  determinants  of remittances  the  composition  of the family  at home  and
abroad,  the level  of disposable  income  (wage)  in the host country,  the income
differentials,  and  the  anticipated  length  of  stay. Empirical  evidence  in  general
corroborates  the  predictions  of  this  framework.  For  example,  Swamy  (1981)  found
that  the  ratio  of females  to  the  total  labor  population  of each  nationality  hasa  negative  and  significant  impact  on  remittances  in  some  Mediterranean  countries.
Also,  migrants  with  poorer  or socially  lower  status  (low  caste  in  India)  or le
education  tend to have significantly  higher  rates  of remittances  (Oberai  and
Singh  (1980),  Serageldin  et.  al.  (1981)).  The  level  of  wages  in  the  host  country
and the  number of migrants have alao been found to be  among the major
determinants  (Swamy  (1981),  and Birks  and  Sinclair  (1979)).
2.2.  Portfolio  Approach  to IWR
The  concept  of "desired"  remittances  is the  basis  of the  portfolio
approach.  Desired remittances  emerge as a result  of a broader  process of
portfolio  allocation  by  the  migrant  worker. The  migrant  must  decide  whether  to
maintain  his  savings  in  the host  country  or to remit  them  home,  in  the form  of
financial  or real assets. This approach  focuses  on relative  rates  of return,
relative  prices  and  uncertainty  as  primary  determinants  in  the  decision  to  remit
(Swamy (1981)4,  Katseli and Glytsos (1986),  Miranda (1988)  and Straubhaar
(1986)).
Swamy  (1981)  presents  a simple  model  of remittances  which  includes
the following  as  major  potential  determinants:  the "incentive"  interest  rates
on foreign  currency  deposits  in  the  sending  country  relative  to  the  interest  rate
on comparable  maturity  deposits  in the receiving  countries,  the rate of real
return  on real estate  in the home  country  relative  to comparable  rate of real
return  on bank  deposits  in  the receiving  countries,  the  difference  between  the
black  market exchange  rate and the official  exchange  rate (the  black market
premium)  in  the  home  country  and  the  difference  between  the  preferential  exchange
4  However,  in  the  empirical  implementation  of her  model,  Swamy  (1981)  also
introduced  family-related  indicators.-7-
rate  for  remittancec  (if  any)  and  the  official  exchange  rate  in  the  home  country.
The first  and last  factors  studied  by Swamy  directly  reflect  the  effect  of the
special  incentive  schemes  introduced  by labor-exporting  countries  to  enhance  IWR
through  official  channels. Swamy  tests  the  model  using  data  from  Greece,  Turkey
and  Yugoslavia over  eighteen years and  found that  remittances  were  not
significantly  affected  by any  of the above  factors. Instead,  Swamy's  results
show  that about  90 percent  of the  variations  in remittance  flows  are  explained
by the stock  of workers  abroad  and  their  earnings.
Swamy's  broad  conclusions  are supported  by Straubhaar  (1986),  who
builds  a simple  model  to examine  the  remittances  of Turkish  workers  in  Germany.
The model is tested through a reduced form equation in which the flow of
remittances  is  a  function  of  the  deviation  of  the  official  exchange  rate  from  the
one  defined  by  a  purchasing  power  parity  equilibrium  between  Turkey  and  Germany,
the  difference  between  expected  real rate  of returns  to investment  in  the  home
and  the  host country,  the  stock  of  Turkish  workers  in  Germany,  and  their  wages.
In Straubhaar's  model all  variables  are  expressed  in variations. Like Swamy,
Straubhaar  also found  remittances  to be significantly  affected  by the stock  of
workers  and  their  income,  but not  by the  other  variables.
Kateeli  and  Glytsos  (1986) incorporate risk  factors in  an
intertemporal  model of exchange  of factors,  more specifically  an exchange  of
abundant  unskilled  labor  for  scarce  capital. The inflow  of capital  takes  the
form of remittances  while the migrant  is abroad,  and human capital  upon his
return. Katseli  and  Glytsos  generate  a  budget  constraint  for  the  migrant  where
the return  on the  portfolio  is  a function  of his  wealth,  the  relevant  interest
rates (foreign  and domestic)  and the exchange  rate variability. The budget
constraint  and  the  risk return  preference  schedule  jointly  determine  the  shareof the migrant's portfolio to be placed in assets in the home country.  The
authors  test  their  model  using  Greek  migration  data  and  find  per  capita
remittances to be positively related to per capita income and interest rates in
the host country and negatively related to inflation rates in the home country.
The  home  interest  rate  is  significant  with  a  negative  sign  but  becomes
insignificant when domestic inflation is introduced, suggesting that the home
interest rate and domestic inflation are positively correlated.
To summarize, while the impact of income and demographic variables
seem to be corroborated by most studies, the evidence on the impact of relative
rates of return is more mixed.  Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar  (1986) found that
interest rate differentials between the host and home countries have no effect
on  remittance flows,  while Katseli and  Glytsos (1986)  find  per  capita remittances
to  be related  to the foreign  interest  rate, although the  coefficient is  positive,
implying that the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect.
The failure  to find a significant influence  of differential rates of
return on remittances may be caused by a correlation of home country interest
rates with  other  variables.  For  instance, high  interest  rates  on  foreign
exchange-denominated deposits in the home country  may simply reflect the risk of
appropriation of these deposits. 5 Likewise, high interest rates on domestic
currency deposits in the home country may simply reflect the high level and
volatility of domestic inflation.  In these cases, the migrant's perception of
risk and uncertainty may more than offset the interest differential.  Indeed,
Katseli  and Glytsos  (1986) interpret the negative  influence of home  country
5 Many  labor exporting countries  introduce foreign exchange deposits  in
order to attract the remittances of workers abroad.  In the cases where foreign
exchange is  primarily used to finance imports there is  always some risk of force
conversion, freeze,  or  appropriation,  because  the financial  system  becomes unable
to meet large net withdrawals.- 9  -
inflation  rate on remittances  as a proxy for general  political  and economic
uncertainty,  rather  than a  price  variable  in  the  migrant's  portfolio. There  is
also  evidence  that  migrant  workers  are  very sensitive  to political  developments
in the  home  country  (e.g.  Chandavarkar  (1980)).
The  fact  that  remittances  can  flow  to  the  labor-exporting  countries
through  official  or unofficial  channels  introduces  an additional  complexity,
since  the  decision  concerning  the  level  of remittances  is  clearly  linked  to  the
channel  used to remit.  This is a very important  issue,  since  there is ample
anecdotal  evidence  that  the  volume  of unofficial  remittances  is substantial  in
many countries,  accounting  for a  large share  of total remittances  to these
countries.  In the Sudan,  only 24 percent  of migrants  surveyed  used official
banking channels (Serageldin  et. al. (1981)),  while in Yemen private  agents
provide  the  principal  transfer  mechanism  (El-Erian  (1988)). There  is  a  variety
of  informal  channels  through  which  the  migrant  can  remit,  including  triangular
operations  with family,  friends  and  middlemen  who actually  operate  outside  the
home country.  Although  the recourse  to informal  channels  usually  involves  a
cost,  the migrant  will be willing  to incur  such costs  when there is a large
premium  between  the exchange  rates  in the  black  and  official  markets.
The black  market  premium  becomes  a central  variable  in the  models
that focus on the choice  of channels  of remittances  (Miranda  (1988),  Wahba
(1989)).  These  models  characterize  the  migrant  as  an investor  facing  arbitrage
conditions,  whereby  he  equates  the  expected  ;arginal benefits  and  costs  for  using
the  black  market. Wahba (1989)  derives  a  model  which  combines  the  determinants
of the level  and the channel  of transfer.  The model is developed  within  a
framework  of portfolio  management  where the agent faces perfect arbitrage
conditions.  As such,  there  is  a  binary  outcome  where  the  migrant  either  remits- 10  -
all  of his savings  or remits  nothing. According  to Wahba's  model,  the worker
will channel  his remittances  through  the official  channel  if the black  market
premium  is smaller  than the cost of using  the black  market.  Wahba  tests the
model for Egypt and shows official  remittances  to be sensitive  to the black
market  premium.  The  same  conclusion  is  reached  by  Miranda  (1988)  for  Bangladesh,
and by Rocha (1989)  for  the Maghreb  countries. The policy  implications  from
these  results  is  that  large  exchange  rate  misalignments  can  divert  a  substantial
volume  of  remittances  away  from  official  channels  and  towards  parallel  markets,
despite  the existence  of incentives,  such as preferential  interest  rates or
exchange  rates.
2.3.  A Synthesis  of the  Two  AyProaches
Although the two approaches  focus on different aspects of the
decision  to  remit,  a synthesis  can  be  clearly  envisaged. The  first  approach  can
be seen as determining  a "required"  level  of remittances,  that tends to be
substantially  dominated  by income  and demographic  variables,  and much less
influenced  by  economic  policy. Under  the  second  approach,  portfolio  factors  and
the  macroeconomic  environment  in  the  home  and  host  countries  (especially  in  the
former) influence the residual level of remittances,  i.e., the excess of
"desired"  over  "required"  remittances. 6 Implicitly  assuming  this  last  component
to be transitory,  Glytsos  (1988)  argues  that  the socio-demographic  and income
factors--the  fundamentals  of the first  approach--are  the long-run  determinants
of  the  remittance  function,  and  that  economic  policy  has  only  a  short-run  effect,
essentially  by shifting  remittances  around  the long-run  trend.
6  The  concept  of "desired"  remittances  is  due  to  Katseli  and  Glytsos  (1986),
and "required"  remittances  to Glytsos  (1988).- 11  -
Macroeconomic  policies  in  the  labor-exporting  country  may,  however,
influence  the choice  of the channel  of transfer--official  versus  unofficial.
Furthermore,  it is argued  that as the stock of migrants  becomes older,  the
"required"  component  of remittances  experiences  a secular  decline  and becomes
relatively  les  important.  This means that the short-run  versus long-run
dichotomy  between the two sets of influences  is not as straightforward  as
suggested by Glytsos (1988).  Since actual remittances  data reflect both
"required"  and "desired"  components,  any  empirical  model  that strives  to have
meaningful policy implications  must account for the determinants  of both
concepts.
Except for few exceptions (Katseli  and Glytsos (1986),  Glytsos
(1988),  and  Swamy  (1981)),  no such  synthesis  exists  in  the  literature.  Katseli
and  Glytsos  explicitly  consider  the  above  two  concepts  and,  as  noted  above,  find
remittances  from  Greek  migrants  in  Germany  to  be  positively  related  to  income  per
capita  and interest  rate in Germany,  and  negatively  related  to income  and  the
inflation  rate  in  Greece. However,  Katseli  and  Glytsos  fail  to account  for  the
length  of  stay--a  major  determinant  of  remittances.  This  deficiency  is  partially
rectified  in Swamy (1981)  by introducing  the ratio of females  to males.  A
further  important  finding  of  Swamy  is  the  significant  and  positive  effect  of  the
stock  of migrant  workers. However,  Swamy  failed  to find significance  for  the
black  market  premium  in her  cross-country  regressions.
To recapitulate,  a  useful  empirical  model  for  the  determination  of
officlal  remittances  must include  the following:
(1)  The  income  level  in  the  host  country or  the  income
differential  between  the  host  and  home  countries;  the  stock  of- 1id  -
migrant  population  or migrant  workers;  and a proxy for the
length  of stay,  based  perhaps  on a  discounted  measure  of the
stock  of  migrant  population  or  migrant  workers; Theae  factors
constitute  the  minimum  set  of fundamentals  needed  to account
for  the "required"  component  of remittances.
(2)  The interest  rate differential  between the host and home
countries,  the rate  of domestic  inflation  and  tho  premium  in
the black  market for foreign  exchange  in the home country,
although  the  interactions between  the  interest  rate
differential and  the  premium  should  preclude  their
simultaneous inclusion (Dornbusch  at  al  (1983)).  The
existence  of  incentives  such  as  preferential  interest  rates  or
exchange rates should  be duly taken into account in the
construction  of the  variables.
(3)  The  empirical  framework  should  permit  testing  for  whether  each
of  the  above  factors  has  influence  in  the  short-run,  the  long-
run  or both.
3.  EXTERNAL  MIGRATION  AD  REMITTANCES  IN  NORTH  AFRICA  AND  EUROPE
In this  section  we explore  the  patterns  of official  remittances  in
six  major  labor-exporting  countries  in  North  Africa  and  Europe:  Algeria,  Morocco,
Portugal,  Tunisia,  Turkey  and  Yugoslavia.  The  host  countries  that  have  absorbed
most of the migration  from these areas have been: Austria,  Belgium,  France,
Germany,  the Netherlands,  Sweden  and Switzerland. The period  of analysis  has- 13 -
also  been  determined  by  the  availability  of  data  on  workers  and  total  population
abroad,  starting  in  1977  and  ending  in  1989. Subscribing  to  the  framework  of  the
previous  section,  we also make a preliminary  assessment  of the relevance  of
demographic,  income  and  other  macroeconomic  factors  as  potential  determinants  of
official  remittances.
Figure  1  shows  the  normalized  values  of  three  key  variables--workers'
remittances  in  current  US  dollars,  the  average  income  in  the  host  countries,  also
in current US dollars,  and the number  of workers abroad.  For each labor-
exporting  country  there  is  a series  measuring  the (weighted)  average  income  per
capita in the host countries. 7 The appendix provide more information  on
demographic  and macroeconomic  indicators  for each of the six labor-exporting
countries,  and  a detailed  account  of data  sources  and  construction.
Figure  1 suggests  that remittances  are  closely  correlated  with the
income  cycles  in the  host  countries  and,  to a lesser  extent,  with  the stock  of
migrant  workers. The  three  variables  are  closely  related  in  the  case  of  Morocco
and  Turkey. Remittances  are  closely  related  to host  country  income  in  the  case
of Portugal  and Tunisia and, to a less extent, in the case of Algeria and
Yugoslavia. The relation  between  remittances  and the number  of workers  seems
weaker  in these  four  cases. 8
Although the association  between remittances  and the number of
nationals  working  abroad  seems  weak  on an individual  basis,  it  is substantially
7  For instance,  in  the  case  of Morocco  this  series  is the  weighted  average
of income  per  capita  in  each  of  the  seven  major  host  countries,  the  weights  being
the shares  of Moroccan  workers  in  each  respective  host  country.
8  The  very  close  correspondence  between  the  dollar  value  of  remittances  and
income  in  the  host  countries  is  partly  due  to  the  fluctuations  of  the  dollar  vis-
a-via  the European  currencies. The econometric  estimation  of remittances  in
section  4 avoids  any possible  bias by measuring  the variables  in real  German
Marks.- 14 -
strong  across  countries. As shown  in  Figure  2 and  Table  1,  the  countries  with
larger  numbers  of  workers  abroad  also  tend  to have  larger  remittances,  the  only
exception  being  Algeria. Of course,  the  relation  is  not  strictly  proportional.
There  are  significant  differences  between per  capita remittances across
countries,  whether  remittances  are  divided  by the  number  of workers  abroad  or
total  population  abroad. Excluding  Algeria  from  the  comparison,  average  yearly
remittances  per  worker  during  the  1977-89  period  ranged  from  US$2,700  in  the  case
of Turkey  to US$4,200  in the case  of Morocco. Average  yearly  remittances  per
total  population  ranged  from  US$1,100  in the  case  of Turkey  to US$2,200  in  the
case  of Portugal. 9 Per  capita  remittances  to Algeria  are  considerably  lower.
These  differences  in per capita  remittances  may be partly  due to
noise in the migration  data.  The number  of unregistered  migrants  may vary
significantly  across countries  and over time.  However, they also reflect
differences  in the length  of stay and many other factors.  Consider first
differences  in the length  of stay.  Although  most of the registered  migrant
workers arrived in Western Europe before 1977, there are still significant
differences  in  the  length  of stay. The  very  low  level  of  remittances  per  worker
in the case of Algeria  is partly  explained  by the relatively  old history  of
Algerian  migration  to France. The  same  is  true  for  Turkey:  although  the  number
of Turkish  workers  continued  to grow after 1977,  most of Turkish  migrants  had
arrived  in  Europe  well  before  that  year. By  contrast,  the  Moroccan  and  Tunisian
migration  are relatively  recent.  That can partly  explain  the high level  of
remittances  per  worker  in  the  two  countries.
9  These figures  imply  monthly  per capita  remittances  of US$250--350  when
measured  by the number  of workers  abroad,  and of US$100-200  when measured  by
total  population  abroad. These  orders  of  magnitude  seem  reasonable,  especially
considering  the income  earned  by  wives  and  other  family  members  through  informal
jobs.- 15  -
Figure 1
Remittances (US$), Income per Capita in Host Countries (USS), and Number of Workers Abroad
(Normalized Series)
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FIGURE  2
Remittances  and  Number  of  Workera  Abroad
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Remittances  (US)  - Workers  Abroad
Table  1
Remittances, Workers Abroad and Total Population Abroad, 1977-89 Averages
(Remittances in US$ Millions, Migrants in Thousands,
Per Capita Remittances in US$)
Algeria  Morocco  Portugal  Tunisia  Turkey  Yugoslavia
Remittances  216  1,007  1,886  338  2,148  1,704
Workers Abroad  293  237  496  90  769  550
Popul. Abroad  816  696  871  217  1,910  966
Remit./Workers  754  4,200  3,810  3,730  2,740  3,090
Remit./Popul.  267  1,430  2,180  1,530  1,100  1,760
Sources: Migration data: OECD.
Remittances: Individual Country Sources.- 17 -
success  in  mobilizing  remittances  also seems  to be correlated  with
indicators  of macroeconomic  policy.  For example,  the three top performers--
Morocco,  Portugal  and  Tunisia--experienced  very  low  average  rates  of inflation
during  this  period*  8,  18  and  11  percent,  respectively.  'rhe  average  black  market
premium  was  also  very  low:  5,  6 and  5  percent,  respectively.  The  corresponding
averages  for  the  following  three  countrLes--Yugoslavia,  Turkey,  and  Algeria--were
significantly  highers  151,  43,  and  10  percent  for  inflation;  and  11,  12,  and  270
percent  for  the  premlum,  respectively. 10
To summarize,  this section  provides  preliminary  evidence  that the
flow  of remittances  to labor-exporting  countries  in  North  Africa  and  Europe  is
positively  correlated  with  the  number  of  nationals  working  abroad  and  income  in
the  host  countries.  Cross-country  comparisons  also  suggest  that  remittances  tend
to deelLne  with the aging  of the migrant  population. Finally,  there is also
indication  that  remittances  tend  to  be  higher  in  countries  where  lnflation  is low
and  the  exchange  rate is  not  mlsaligned.
4.  ECONOMETRXC  ESTIMATION  OF TIE  RBMITTANCE  FUNCTION
4.1.  Model  Soecification
In this section  we specify  and  estimate  a family  of simple  linear
specifications  relating  remittance  flows  to some  of the  determinants  identified
ln section  2 above. The  econometric  estimatLon  will  be based  on the  following
four  equations:
10  Although  Algeria's  average  rate  of inflation  looks  low  in  comparison  with
the other countries,  inflation  was severely  repressed  by pervasive  and strict
priee  controls  during  the  sample  period. The  accumulation  of  a  monetary  overhang
during this period was actually  one of the major causes  of the large and
increasing  black  market  premium (see  Rocha (1989a)).- 18 -
log  Remt  =  CO + 1  log  workt  +  aa  log  Yhoste
(I)  +  £3  log  Premc + £4 Length,
+  a.  Inft  + a'  DUM
log  Rempcw,  =  ao+  a,.  log  Yhost,  + a2 premC
+  a3  Length,  + a  Inf,  + of  DUM
log  Remr  =  90 + al  log  PoPt  + a2 log  Yhostt
.III)  +  £3  Premt  +  a4  Length,
+  a4 Infe  + a'  DUM
log  Rempcp,  = a,  log  Yhoste  +  £2  Prem,  +  £3  Length,
+ a.  Inft  + a'  DUN
where  Rem is the  real DM value  of official  remittances  to the labor-exporting
countriees  Work is the stock of migrant  workers;  Pop is the stock of total
migrant  population;  Rempcw  is  remittances  per  migrant  worker  (Rem/Work);  Rempcp
is remittances  per  migrant  person  (Rem/Pop);  Yhost  is the  real  DM value  of the
average  per capita income  of the host countries;  Prem is the black market- 19  -
premium,  defined  as  the  percentage  difference  between  the  black  market  exchange
rate  and  the  official  exchange  rate;  Length  is a  proxy  for  the length  of stay;
Inf is  the rate of domestic  inflation  in the labor-exporting  country;  and  Dum
includes  country-specific  dummies  plus a dummy for Turkey in 1979--the  year
preceding  a  major  change  in the  political  regime  and a  stabilization  program. 11
Note that  equations  I and  II use  the  stock  of migrant  workers,  while  equations
III and IV use the stock of total migrant population (workers  and their
families).
Remittances  and per capita  income  in the host country  were both
expressed  in  real  DMs  because  the  DM  is  one  of  the  two  major  currencies  in  which
remittance.  to the  countries  under  examination  are  denominated  (the  other  being
the French  Franc).  In addition,  the use of the DM avoids  any possible  bias
arising  from  the use  of the  US dollar--the  large  fluctuations  of the  US dollar
vis-a-vis  the  European  currencies  during  the  sample  period  could  cause  a  spurious
correlation  between  remittances  and income.  In any case,  this section  also
reports  the  regression  results  obtained  with  the  US dollar.
The Length  of stay  was proxied  by two alternative  variables. The
first  proxy  is  the  ratio  of  the  actual  stock  of  migrant  workers  (or  total  migrant
population)  relative  to a  discounted  stock,  using  a 5  percent  rate  of  discount.
Therefore,  this ratio is higher  the "older"  the history  of migration,  or the
longer  the average  length  of stay.  The length  of stay  was also proxied  by a
simple  linear  trend.
11  Remittances  to Turkey  declined  dramatically  during  the late 19709  and
staged  a  recovery  in  mid-1979,  with  the  first  attempt  to  correct  a  large  exchange
rate  misalignment.  However,  the  political  turmoil  and  the  failure  to  effectively
correct  the  misalignment  drove  remittances  back  to very low levels  in  the last
months  of 1979.  Yearly  figures  seem  to suggest  a recovery  of remittances  in
1979,  but such  recovery  actually  started  only after  the 1980  program.- 20 -
In the  above models, the demographic  and  income factors are
represented  by log  Work (log  Pop),  log  Yhost  and  Length. The  coefficient  of log
Work (log  Pop) Lu expected  to be positive,  possibly  with a unitary  elasticity
(e.g.  Swamy  (1981)).  Log  Yhost  should  also  enter  positively,  since  it  is  a  major
determinant  of  savings  in  the  host  country.  The  two  proxies  measuring  the  length
of stay,  on the  other  hand,  should  have  a negative  effect  on remittances,  as an
aging  labor  force  abroad  will  tend  to have les  ties  with the  home country  and
therefore  remit less.  A potential determinant  not included in the above
specifications  is  the  real  per  capita  income  in  the  labor-sending  country. This
variable  serves  as  a proxy  for  a possible  contractual  obligation  to the  rest  of
the family  back  home  on the  part  of the  migrant  member. However,  the inclulion
of the  sending  country  per  capita  income  did  not  produced  satisfactory  results.
The  remaining set  of  factors account for  the  portfolio and
macroeconomic  determinants  of  official  remittances.  The  portfolio  determinants
are  represented  by the  premium  on the  black  market  for  foreign  exchange  and  the
differential  between  the  depreciation-adjusted  interest  rates  at  home  and  abroad.
a  high  premium  or a higher  devaluation-adjusted  foreign  interest  rate  compared
to  the  domestic  rate  are  expected  to discourage  official  remittances.  However,
the interest  rate differential  was found  to be consistently  insignificant  as
well,  leaving  us  with  the  premium  and  domestic  inflation  to  reflect  portfolio  and
macroeconomic  consideration. A high inflation  should  lead  to lower  official
remittances  since  it  reflect  increased  risk  and  uncertainty.  Since  the  premium
is directly  related  to the market for remittances,  it should  have a greater
impact  on remittances  than  domestic  inflation.- 21  -
4.2  An Overview  of the  Results
Tables  2-A,  2-B,  3-A  and  3-B  show  the  OLS  estimates  of  models  I,  II,
III  and  IV,  respectively.  The  results  were  obtained  from  the  use  of  panel  data
for  Morocco,  Portugal,  Tunisia,  Turkey  and  Yugoslavia,  over  the  period  1977-89.
Therefore,  the sample  comprises  65 observations. The exclusion  of  Algeria
improved  considerably  the results across  all the specifications  considered.
Indeed,  it  seems  that  the  pattern  of  remittances  in  Algeria  is  different  from  the
other  countries  because  of the  much longer  history  of migration  and  its  highly
centralized  economy.
The  results  shown  in  tables  2-A,  2-B,  3-A  and  3-B  are  generally  very
good. The  coefficients  of all  of  the  variables  have  the  predicted  signs  and  are
usually  statistically  significant.  In  addition,  the  estimates  that  were  obtained
with  the  stock  of  migrant  workers  are  remarkably  comparable  to  the  ones  based  on
the stock  of total  migrant  population. Regarding  the demographic  and income
variables,  the  results  are  consistent  with  previous  studies  (e.g.  Glyteos  (1988),
Katseli  and Glytsos (1986),  Rocha (1989)  and Swamy (1981)  to mention a few
examples).  In  addition,  we  found  strong  and  systematic  evidence  on  the  relevance
of  macroeconomic  and  portfolio  factors  to  the  long-run  determination  of  official
remittances.
The imposition  of a unitary  elasticity  relative  to the stock of
workers (or population),  does not result in any noticeable  change in the
estimated  coefficients,  as shown  in  tables  2-B and  3-B.  Indeed,  the increased
robustness  of  the  estimated  coefficients  lends  strong  support  to  the  per  capita
models, despite the loss of the explanatory  power compared  to case of the
unrestricted  levels  models. Such  feature  does  not  obtain  in  previous  literature.- 22 -
For example,  Swamy's (1981)  estimated  income  elasticities  were consistently
higher  in  the  per  capita  model  compared  to  their  levels  regression  counterparts.
The time invariant  country-specific  dummies  were in general not
significant in  the  levels regressions, but  their  significance improved
substantially  in  the  per  capita  models. The  same  evidence  is  obtained  in  Swamy
(1981).  The special  1979 dummy for Turkey  was significant  in most of the
equations  and  increased  the  coefficient  and  the  significance  of  the  premium. As
mentioned  before,  in  the  middle  of 1979  remittances  to  Turkey  staged  a recovery
as the government  started  to devalue  the Turkish  Lira.  However,  remittances
dropped  again  in  the  second  half  of  the  year,  with  the  political  turmoil  and  the
persistent  exchange  rate misalignment. The yearly  figures  for 1979 show an
increase  in  remittances  and  a large  premium,  which  tends  to reduce  somewhat  the
size and significance  of the coefficient  of the black market  premium  in the
regressions. This problem  is corrected  by the inclusion  of the dummy.
4.3  Some  Diacnostic  Tests  and  Further  Estimates
The  estimation  of the  above  fixed  effects  model 12 gives  rise  to  two
diagnostic  tests. The  first  is  a  test  for  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  and
the second  is a test for the potential  endogeneity  of the macroeconomic  and
portfolio  determinants  of remittances.
12  Estimations  with a random  effects  model failed  to produce  satisfactory
results.  In the  event that the variables are trending over time, the
"differenced"  random  effect  model  will be inadequate  for  the underlining  data
generation  process.- 23  -
We use a version of the t!est  jproposed  by White (1980)  to assess the
presence of heteroskedasticity.1 3 The tests were conduced for the OLS- estimated
models of tables 2-A and 3-A, and the results are presented in table 4.  The
results lend strong support to the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity: out
of the 20 tests reported in  table 4, the null hypothesis  was only rejected at the
5  percent significance level in two cases.  Furthermore, the differences between
the  White  heteroskedasticity-robust  standard  errors  and  their  conventional
counterparts were minor.  Therefore, we decided to accept the null hypothesis of
no heteroskedasticity.
Based on the assumption of no heteroskedasticity, we tested for  the
endogeneity of the  black market premium and for  both the premium and  the domestic
rate of inflation.1 4 We conducted a series of sequential tests using a Hausman
(1978)  type metric.15 First we tested for the endogeneity  of the premium alone
(i.e.  assuming  exogeneity of inflation).  The  endogeneity of inflation  was tested
13  This test is an extension of White (1980)  to the case of panel data, as
noted in Chamberlain  (1982).  The test  is given by  17R 2 _  X2 where  R2 is
based on the regression of the squared of the residuals from models (2-A) or
(3-A)  on the moments of the right side variables of model  (1-A) (or 2-A).
14  The teots for  endogeneity are substantially simplified in  the absence of
heteroskedasticity.
is  Assuming the following linear relationship (A)  y =  X1BI  + X2B2 + e, where
X1 is a single variable which  is possibly correlated with e  (a homoskedastic
disturbance term), while X2 are not.  Given the matrix of instruments Z (which
should  include X2), let  21 = P_Xl =  Z(Z/Z)  Z'Xl, and consider the following
expression:
(B)  Y =  XIB1 + X2B2 + X.B3 +V
Now a test  for Ho: B3 =  0 (a test for the null hypothesis of no covariation
between X1 and e in (A)) is given by the t-statistic corresponding to the OLS
estimator of B3.- 24  -
based on the results obtained  for the premium.  The justification  for this
procedure  is  a  strong  prior  on  the  endogeneity  of  the  premium.  Indeed,  unofficial
remittances  may  constitute  one  of  the  main  sources  of supply  in  the  black  market
for foreign  exchange.  Thus, the diversion  of rem  .ttances  from official  to
unofficial  channels  is  likely  to  exert  a  strong  impact  on  the  premium. Inflation
on the  other  hand,  tends  to be more directly  influenced  by other  macroeconomic
factors,  as well as by price controls,  and is only indirectly  related to
remittances. The first  test  was conducted  for  all  of the  models  of tables  2-A
and  3-A,  while  the second  and  more laborious  test  was  only  applied  to equations
9 and 10  of the above  two  tables. 16 The  results  are  presented  in  table  5.
The  results  of  the  first  test  strongly  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of
exogeneity  of the premium for regressions  6-10 in tables 2-A and 3-A.  The
marginal  significance  levels  of the tests  are 1 percent for  nine cases  and 2
percent  for  the  remaining  regression.  On  the  other  hand,  we could  not  reject  the
hypothesis  of  premium  exogeneity  in  equations  1-5  of  tables  2-A  and  3-A. Despite
this seemingly  inconclusive  evidence,  we believe that the overall evidence
suggests  that the premium is endogenous.  First, regressions  1-5 could be
misspecified,  as  they  exclude  the  rate  of inflation.  Second,  a  comparison  of  the
OLS estimated coefficients  to their TSLS counterparts  reveals that these
16 The test procedure depends on whether the endogeneity  of the two
variables  is  tested  jointly,  or whether  the  endogeneity  of inflation  is  tested
based  on  a  prior  assumption  on  the  endogeneity  of  the  premium. The  basic  Hausman
test presented  in footnote  (14)  above  applies  only  to the first  test.  In the
case  of testing  for  the endogeneity  of X 1 conditional  on the endogeneity  of X2
(the second  test)  the conditioning  regressor,  'ki  in equation (B)  should  be
replaced  with  Rl,  £2, where  R1  and  R2  are  given  as  a linear  combination  of  the
residuals  from the  auxiliary individual  regressions  of Xl and X2 on the
respective instruments (see Maddala  (1988), pp  439-441, for  a  detailed
description).  The  test  is given  as  in  (14) above by  the  t-statistic
corresponding  to the  OLS  estimator  of the  coefficient  of X1 .- 25 -
coefficients  are remarkably  stable except for the premium.  Therefore,  we
accepted  the hypothesis  of premium  endogeneity  and proceeded  to test for  the
hypothesis  of inflation  exogeneity  given  the endogeneity  of the premium.  The
results  shown  in  the lower  panel  of table  5 strongly  support  the  exogeneity  of
inflation.
The regressions  were estimated  by TSLS in order to avoid the
simultaneity  bias.  The set of instruments  comprised  the nominal growth  of
domestic  credits,  the lagged  premium  and the  current  and lagged  values  of the
exogenous  variables (all explanatory  variables  but the premium).  The TSLS
estimates  are  presented  in tables  2-C,  2-D, 3-C,  and 3-D.  Tables  2-C  and 2-D
show the  results  obtained  with the stock  of migrant  workers,  with remittances
defined  in  levels  and  per  capita  terms,  respectively.  Tables  3-C  and  3-D  present
the results  obtained  with the  stock  of total  migrant  population. A comparison
of the results  obtained  through  OLS and  TSLS  reveals  that  the  most significant
change  lies  in  the  coefficient  of  the  premium--the  TSLS  estimates  are  three  times
higher  (in  absolute  value)  than  their  OLS  counterparts.  It  should  be  mentioned
that  very  similar  results  were  obtained  when  inflation  was  considered  endogenous
in additional  (unreported)  TSLS  regressions.  These  results  are  consistent  with
the formal  endogeneity  tests  reported  before. 17
4.4.  Interpretation  of the  Results
In this section  we select  a representative  equation  and  use it to
derive  some  policy  implications.  First,  despite  the  reasonable  results  obtained
17  Treating  the  stock  of  migtant  workers  as  endogenous  and  enlarging  further
the set of instruments  did not produce  different  results  either,  although  a
broader  theoretical  framework  would  imply  treating  both  remittances  and  the  stock
of  migrant  workers  as  endogenous. The  fact  that  most  of the  migration  occurred
before  the  start  of  the sample  period  may  be  the  explanation  for  these  results.- 26 -
with  the  OLS  estimates,  the  implications  of  the  endogeneity  tests  eliminate  these
model.  from  our  consideration  for  further  analysis. Therefore,  we  will confine
ourselves  to equations  (9)  and (10)  in  tables  2-C,  2-D,  3-C  and  3-D. Aside  from
the  steep  decline  in  explanatory  power  (especially  for  the  regressions  of  table
2-D), the per capita  regressions  generally  perform  better  relative  to their
levels regression  counterparts.  The significance  levels of the estimated
coefficients  for  the  demographic,  income,  and  policy  variables  generally  improve
and most of the country  dummies turned from statistically  insignificant  to
significant  effects.  Furthermore,  while both measures  of the length  of stay
perform  well (the  ratio  of the  actual  stock  to  the  discounted  stock  in  equation
(9)  and the  time trend in  equation  (10)),  the  measure  used in equation  (9)  is
more precise  and more directly  related  to the problem  at hand.  Therefore,  we
will select  equation  (9) from  each of tables  2-D and 3-D to use for further
analysis.
The  derived  elasticities  for  both  equations  are  presented  in table
6.  The  unitary  elasticity  estimated  for  the  stock  of  workers  (or  population)  is
theoretically  attractive,  as it  implies  a  proportional  effect  of an increase  in
the  number  of  workers  (or  population)  on  the  level  of remittances.  Swamy  (1981)
argue.  that a model failure  to uphold  this proportionality  suggests  that the
equation is  underspecified,  in  terms of  the  variables that  alter this
proportionality  relationship.  Another  important  demographic  factor  which  has  a
significant  and  appreciable  effect  is  the length  of stay. This  variable  has  an
elasticity  of -0.43 for  the  workers  model and  -0.40 for  the  population  model.
This  effect  implies  that for  any  given  number  of migrant  workers  (population),
the  flow  of  remittances  is  expected  to  be smaller  the  longer  their  average  stay.
of  course, such decline in remittances  is ultimately  associated  with the- 27 -
weakening  of  the  ties  with  the  home  country.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the
demographically-inclined  theoretical  models  of  remittances,  which  endogenize  the
migrant  decision  along  with  the  decision  to  remit. A  closely  related  indicator--
the  ratio  of female  to male migrants--was  estimated  to have similar  effect  on
remittances  (Swamy  (1981)).
The elasticity  of real income  in  the host  country  was  estimated  at
0.62 for the stock  of workers-based  model compared  to 0.48 for the stock of
population  model.  In both models,  it is clear  that economic  activity  in the
receiving  countries,  has  had  an  important  effect  on the  level  of  remittances  per
worker (or  population)  sent to the country  of origin.  In terms of policy
implications,  this  finding  suggests  that,  in  their  planning  for  future  growth  of
remittances,  labor-exporting  countries  should  explicitly  take  into  consideration
the future  economic  prospects  in the major receiving  countries.  Our income
elasticity  estimates  are  somewhat  lower  than  those  reported  in  previous  studies
(e.g.  Swamy (1981)),  but these studies  usually  expressed  remittances  and host
country per capita income  in current  US dollars,  whereas we expressed  both
variables  in  real  DMs. We reestimated  the  regressions  expressing  both  variables
in current  US dollars,  and  did obtain  an increase  in the income  elasticity  to
unity,  across  all specifications,  as well as a very sharp  increase  in the t-
statistics.  However,  this  procedure  tends  to  introduce  some  spurious  correlation
between  the  two  variables,  especially  when  the  sample  includes  periods  where  the
dollar  fluctuated largely with  respect to  the  original  currencies of
denomination.
The next set of determinants  are the macroeconomic  and portfolio
variables.  The derived elasticity  for the black market premium is almost
identical  in  the  two  models:  -0.34  and  -0.32,  respectively.  Thus,  our  estimates- 28 -
show that official  per capita  remittances  are negatively  and substantially
impacted  by  a  rising  premium. An increase  in  the  premium  by 10  percent  leads  to
a  decline  of  official  per  capita  remittances  by  about  3  percent. As  we know  from
the recent  literature  on the  black  market  foreign  exchange  (Dornbusch,  et. al.
(1983),  Elbadawi  (1992)),  high and  varying  premia  mainly  reflect  expansive  and
inconsistent  macroeconomic  policy  for  given  official  exchange  rate  regimes.  This
large and highly significant  effect of the premium on official remittances
clearly  indicates  that domestic  macroeconomlc  policy  matters. It is not clear
from our  results, however, if a  lower premium lead. to  increased total
remittances,  over  and  above  its  impact  on the  distribution  between  official  and
unofficial  channels. Nevertheles3,  a low  premium  is likely  to lead  to larger
inflows of remittances,  since the premium is also seen as  a  signal of
inconsistent  policies  and  risky  economic  and  political  environment.
The other  macroeconomic  variable  estimated  to have a significant,
although  lower,  elasticity  is the rate  of inflation  in the home country.  An
identical  elasticity  of  -0.03  was  estimated  for  both  models. While  the  inflation
variable  does  not  directly  influence  the size  of official  remittances  relative
to total  remittances,  it does  have  an indirect  influence. A high  and  variable
inflation  is a discouraging  signal for investment  and hence it leads to a
deceleration  of total  remittancee  into  the  labor-exporting  country.
S.  CONCLUsIONS
The paper reviewed  the theoretical  and empirical literature  and
developed  a synthesis  of  the  two  main approaches  that  have  been followed  in  the
analysis  of international  workers'  remittances. Such  a review  suggests  that a
useful  empirical  model  for  the  determination  of  official  remittances  must  include- 29 -
as  determinantst  the  stock  of  workers  (or  population)  abroad,  the  level  of income
in the  host country,  a proxy  for  the length  of stay,  domestic  inflation  in  the
sending country,  the exchange  rate premium in the parallel market (or the
interest  rate  differential  between  the host  and  the home  country),  in addition
to indicators  of special  incentive  schemes  designed  to attract  IWR.
Subscribing  to  the  above  framework,  we  conducted  in  the  third  section
a  preliminary  assessment  of  demographic,  income  and  other  macroeconomic  factors
as  potential determinants  of  official remittances  to  six  labor-exporting
countries  in North Africa and Europe:  Algeria,  Morocco,  Portugal,  Tunisia,
Turkey and Yugoslavia.  Our  analysis shows that remittances  are closely
correlated  with  income  cycles  in  the  host  countries  and,  to  a lesser  extent,  with
the  stock  of migrant  workers. Although  the  association  between  remittances  and
the  number  of nationals  working  abroad  seems  weak  on an individual  basis,  it  is
substantially  strong  across countries.  The relationship  between the three
variables,  however,  is  not  strictly  proportional.  Furthermore,  the  significant
variations  in remittances  per worker across the six countries suggests  an
important  potential  influence  of  the  length  of  stay  and  of  macroeconomic  factors.
A more  rigorous  analysis  was  conducted  in  the  fourth  section  of  the
paper,  based  on  variants  of  the  synthesis  outlined  in  section  two. We estimated
a fixed-effect  model  using  panel  data from  the above  labor-exporting  countries
(excluding  Algeria)  over the 1977-1989  period.  The analysis  included  formal
diagnostic  testing  of heteroakedasticity  and the possible  endogeneity  of the
premium  and  inflation. Our  results  broadly  corroborates  the  predictions  of  the
model and  provide  interesting  policy  implications.
The  stock  of  migrant  labor  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on
real remittances,  and appears with a unitary elasticity.  This result is- 30 -
theoretically  attractive,  as it implies  that the effect  of an increase  in  the
number  of workers  on remittances  is proportional,  ceteris  parlbus.  The length
of stay  is  another  significant  demographic  factor,  appearing  with an  elasticity
of about  -0.40.  A closely  related  indicator,  the share  of females  in total
migrant  population,  was  estimated  to  have  a  similar  effect  on  remittances  (Swamy
(1981)). This result  confirms  the  perception  that remittances  tend  to decline
with  the  aging  of  the  migrant  population  and  the  resulting  weakening  of  ties  with
the home  country.
The  estimates  of the  elasticity  of real  income  in  the host  country
ranged  between  0.6  and  0.8. It  is  clear  that  economic  activity  in  the  receiving
countries  has  had  an  important  effect  on  the  level  of  remittances  per  worker  sent
to the country  of origin.  In terms of policy implications,  those findings
suggest  that,  in  their  planning  for  future  growth  of  remittances,  labor-exporting
countries  should  explicitly  take  into  consideration  the  future  economic  prospects
in the major receiving  countries,  and the geographical  distribution  of their
migrant  labor.
The next set of determinants  are the macroeconomic  and portfolio
variables.  Save few exceptions,  previous  empirical  studies fail to detect
significant  effects  of the later  set of variables.  Our estimates  show that
official  remittances  are  negatively  and  substantially  affected  by  a  rising  black
market  premium. An increase  in  the  premium  by 10 percent  results  in a  decline
of  official  remittances  by about  3  percent. The literature  on the  black  market
foreign  exchange  (e.g.  Dornbusch,  et. al. (1983),  Elbadawi (1992),  and Rocha
(1989a)),  indicates  that high and varying  premia  mainly  reflect  inconsistent
macroeconomic  policies  for  given  official  exchange  rate  regimes. This  large  and- 31 -
significant  effect  of  the  premium  on  official  remittances  clearly  indicates  that
domestic  macroeconomic  policy  matters.
The  domestic  rate  of  inflation  was  also  found  to have  a  negative  and
significant  effect  on remittances,  although  with a  much lower  elasticity:
-0.03.  While  the inflation  variable  does not directly  influence  the size  of
official  remittances  relative  to total  remittances,  it does have an indirect
influence.  A high  and  variable  inflation  is  a  discouraging  signal  for  investment
and hence it leads to a deceleration  of total remittances  into the labor-
exporting  country.
A major  policy  recommendation  that  emerges  from  the  results  is  that
policy-makers  should  correct  macroeconomic  imbalances  policies  before  considering
special incentive schemes to attract remittances.  The correction  of such
imbalances  should lead to an increase in the flow of remittances towards its
long-run  potential.  The aging  of the migrant  population  leads  to a natural
decline in remittances  that is unlikely  to be offset by special incentive
schemes. One  possible  exception  to  this  rule  is  the  establishment  of  a special
scheme  such  as the one  operated  by the  central  bank  of Turkey  and  the  Dresdner
Bank  in  Germany. The  scheme  involved  the  payment  of  premium  interest  rates  for
the deposits  of Turkish  workers  in the Dresdner  Bank,  and  the transfer  of the
resources  to  Turkey  through  the  capital  account. Such  type  of  scheme  may  succeed
in mobilizing  resources  from workers  whose ties with the home country  have
weakened  over  time. However,  the  introduction  of such  schemes  may  also  trigger
a  diversion  of remittances  from  the  current  to  the  capital  account,  with  adverse
consequences  for  debt repayment  capacity  and  creditworthiness,  especially  when
the  interest  rate  premium  is  large,  such  as  the  case  of  Turkey  in  the  mid-1980s.- 32 -
Am mentioned  before,  the paper did not address  a number  of other
relevant  questions  related  to workers'  remittances,  such am their impact  on
traditional  exports,  capital  formation  and  output  growth,  as  well  as  the  best  set
of policieo  to be followed  during  the remittance  cycle.  These are critical
ismuem  that should  be examined  in future  research  work.Table 2-A
OLS  Eat  etes  of  the  Remittance  Function.  Level  of  Remittances.  Stock  of  Vorkers.  OK.
OLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lwork  tyhost  prem  ratio  t  lnf  D3  D4  D5  D6  DT  R2
1.  -1.29  0.85  0.42  -0.79  - - - -0.01  -0.30  -0.24  -0.17  - 0.91
(-0.49)  (2.48)  (1.91)  (-2.17)  - - - (-0.04)  (-0.86)  (-0.58)  (-0.56)  -
2.  -4.09  1.12  0.60  -0.82  0.29  - - -0.20  -0.02  -0.56  -0.39  - 0.92
(-1.45)  (3.17)  (2.61)  (-2.31)  (-2.23)  - - (-0.73)  (-0.07)  (-1.31)  (-1.25)  -
3.  -5.00  1.22  0.60  -0.80  - -0.02  - -0.29  0.06  -0.69  -0.50  - 0.92
(-1.60).  (3.22)  (2.60)  (-2.26)  - (-2.06)  - (-1.00)  (0.15)  (-1.50)  (-1.48)  -
4.  -3.66  1.05  0.59  -1.47  -0.28  - - -0.14  -0.09  -0.47  -0.29  0.54  0.92
(-1.31)  (2.99)  (2.65)  (-2.82)  (2.17)  - - (-0.51)  (-0.27)  (-1.11)  (-0.91)  (1.68)
5.  -4.48  1.40  0.60  -1.45  - -0.02  - -0.23  -0.02  -0.59  -0.39  0.54  0.92
(-1.45)  (3.02)  (2.62)  (-2.77)  - (-1.98)  - (-0.7?)  (-0.05)  (-1.30)  (-1.15)  (1.66)
6.  -3.09  0.75  0.66  -. 8a5  -0.07  0.06  -0.40  -0.11  -0.00  - 0.93
(-1.30)  (2.44)  (3.22)  (-2.62)  - - (-4.03)  (0.26)  (-1.30)  (-0.30)  (-0.01)  - W
7.  -4.73  0.93  0.75  -0.86  -0.19  - -0.06  -0.06  -0.21  -0.33  -0.16  - 0.93
(-1.84)  (2.86)  (3.55)  (-2.69)  (-1.54)  - (-3.60)  (-0.26)  (-0.66)  (-0.85)  (-0.55)  -
8.  -5.31  1.00  0.76  -0.85  - -0.01  -0.06  -0.12  -0.16  -0.41  -0.23  - 0.93
(-1.88)  (2.84)  (3.53)  (-2.65)  - (-1.42)  (-3.65)  (-0.45)  (-0.468)  (-0.97)  (-0.72)  -
9.  -4.23  0.82  0.76  -1.68  -0.16  - -0.07  0.02  -0.32  -0.20  -0.01  0.68  0.94
(-1.71)  (2.61)  (3.75)  (-3.63)  (-1.41)  - (-4.01)  (0.09)  (-1.01)  (-0.52)  (-0.04)  (2.38)
10.  -4.70  0.87  0.7?  -1.68  - -0.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.28  -0.27  -0.67  0.69  0.94
(-1.72)  (2.57)  (3.71)  (-3.60)  - (-1.26)  (-4.06)  (-0.10)  (-0.84)  (-0.64)  (-0.21)  (2.37)Table 2-B
OLS  Estimates of  the  Remittance Funiction. Per Capita Remittances. Stock of  workers.  D".
…--  .-.....-..--.....-.....-.  --.  -.....-- _  ._-......--_  - --......-  ---  -.-  ---  -.  .-..--  -- _ -_-______ OLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lyhost  prem  ratio  t  lnf  D3  D4  D5  06  DT  R2 ........-..-..-.---.-....-...-...-------.---.----.....-..---..-.--......-.---..----.-.-......-.-.---------.......-....-- _.--._ 1.  -1.91  0.40  -0.75  - - - -0.12  -0.15  -0.42  -0.30  - 0.36 (-0.89)  (1.88)  (-2.15)  - - - (-1.45)  (-1.80)  (-4.60)  (-3.29)  -
2.  -3.50  0.60  -0.84  -0.27  - - -0.11  -0.14  -0.42  -0.29  - 0.40 (-1.59)  (2.66)  (-2.48)  (-2.26)  - - (-1.35)  (-1.74)  (-4.81)  (-3.29)  -
3.  -3.77  0.60  -0.85  - -0.02  - -0.13  0.15  -0.43  -0.31  - 0.39 (-1.64)  (2.60)  (-2.46)  - (-2.04)  - (-1.57)  (-1.89)  (-4.86)  (-3.53)  -
4.  -3.42  0.59  -1.48  -0.27  - - -0.10  -0.14  -0.42  -0.25  0.55  0.42 (-1.58)  (2.68)  (-2.98)  (-2.29)  - - (-1.29)  (-1.76)  (-4.87)  (-2.75)  (1.73)
5.  -3.71  0.60  -1.50  - -0.02  - 12  -0.15  -0.43  -0.27  0.55  0.41 (-1.64)  (2.63)  (-2.97)  - (-2.07)  - - '.52)  (-1.91)  (-4.92)  (-2.99)  (1.74)
6.  -4.12  0.63  -0.78  - - -0.07  -0.12  -0.15  -0.41  -0.22  - 0.49 (-2.05)  (3.12)  (-2.50)  - - (-3.98)  (-1.65)  (-2.04)  (-5.11)  (-2.66)  -
7.  -5.06  0.75  -0.84  -0.20  - -0.06  -0.12  -0.15  -0.42  -0.22  - 0.51 (-2.48)  (3.58)  (-2.73)  (-1.76)  - (-3.64)  (-1.56)  (-1.98)  (-5.24)  (-2.70)  -
8.  -5.36  0.76  -0.85  - -0.01  -0.06  -0.13  -0.16  -0.42  -0.24  - 0.51 (-2.54)  (3.56)  (-2.74)  - (-1.66)  (-3.74)  (-1.75)  (-2.11)  (-5.30)  (-2.88)  -
9.  -5.07  0.75  -1.61  -0.19  - -0.07  -0.11  -0.14  -0.41  -0.17  0.66  0.54 (-2.58)  (3.74)  (-3.64)  (-1.75)  - (-4.00)  (-1.51)  (-2.05)  (-5.41)  (-2.02)  (2.33)
10.  -5.37  0.76  -1.63  - -0.01  -0.07  -0.12  -0.15  -0.42  -0.18  0.67  0.54 (-2.65)  (3.73)  (-3.66)  - (-1.68)  (-4.10)  (-1.70)  (-2.18)  (-5.47)  (-2.19)  (2.36)
…--.---...-.-..-...-------.-.-....--.-.--..---.-.......---.---..-..-.----.-.-..-------..._--....  -------- ____-_....--------___Table 2-C
TSLS  Estimates of  the  Remittance Function.  Level of  Remittances. Stock of  Workers.  DN.
TSLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  twork  tyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  D4  DS  D6  OT  R2
1.  1.34  0.56  0.33  -1.45  - - 0.22  -0.55  0.16  0.09  - 0.91 (0.40)  (1.31)  (1.35)  (-1.44)  - (0.66)  (-1.32)  (-0.28)  (0.23)  -
2.  -1.08  0.86  0.46  -1.96  -0.42  - - 0.03  -0.24  -0.16  -0.09  - 0.91 (-0.31)  (1.98)  (1.90)  (-1.92)  (-2.89)  - - (0.08)  (-0.56)  (-0.29)  (-0.23)  -
3.  -2.65  1.04  0.49  -1.98  - -0.03  - -0.14  -0.09  -0.39  -0.29  - 0.91 (-0.72)  (2.26)  (1.96)  (-1.93)  - (-2.83)  - (-0.40)  (-0.19)  (-0.67)  (-0.66)  -
4.  -2.41  0.99  0.52  -1.96  -0.38  - - -0.08  -0.11  -0.39  -0.22  0.73  0.93 (-0.81)  (2.61)  (2.38)  (-1.39)  (-2.96)  - - (-0.28)  (-0.29)  (-0.83)  (-0.57)  (1.06)
5.  -4.13  1.19  0.55  -1.73  - -0.03  - -0.26  0.06  -0.65  -0.44  0.63  0.93 (-1.28)  (2.93)  (2.49)  (-1.19)  - (-2.92)  - (-0.83)  (0.16)  (-1.28)  (-1.09)  (0.88)
6.  0.86  0.31  0.51  -2.21  - - -0.07  0.40  -0.79  0.50  0.44  - 0.91 (0.28)  (0.78)  (2.09)  (-2.88)  - - (-3.53)  (1.31)  (-2.00)  (1.00)  (1.18)  - un
7.  -1.44  0.64  0.61  -2.19  -0.32  - -0.06  0.18  -0.45  0.11  0.17  - 0.92 (-0.46)  (1.60)  (2.55)  (-3.08)  (-2.20)  - (-2.99)  (0.59)  (-1.15)  (0.22)  (0.46)  -
8.  -2.52  0.76  0.62  -2.28  - -0.02  -0.06  0.07  -0.35  -0.04  0.04  - 0.91 (-0.74)  (1.74)  (2.54)  (-3.06)  - (-2.13)  (-2.98)  (0.19)  (-0.82)  (-0.07)  (0.11)  -
9.  -1.54  0.56  0.66  -3.97  -0.25  - -0.07  0.24  -0.52  0.17  0.37  1.73  0.92 (-0.49)  (1.37)  (2.75) (-3.11)  (-1.71)  - (-3.47)  (0.76)  (-1.28)  (0.34)  (0.91)  (2.68)
10.  -2.52  0.67  0.67  -3.94  - -0.02  -0.07  0.14  -0.43  0.03  0.25  1.72  0.92 (-0.75)  (1.52)  (2.80)  (-3.09)  - (-1.67)  (-3.51)  (0.41)  (-0.99)  (0.05)  (0.57)  (2.67)
----  ----  ---  ----  ----  ---  ----  ----  ---  ----  ----  ---  ----  ----  -- _  - --  --  _-  .-- _  _-  .---  -.--  - _  ---  -- _-  ----  ---  -_--  ---Table 2-D
TSLS  Estimates of  the  Remittance Function.  Per Capita Remittances. Stock of  Workers. ON.
TSLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  D4  D5  D6  DT  R2
1.  -1.06  0.32  -0.92  - - - -0.11  -0.12  -0.40  -0.31  - 0.39 (-0.42)  (1.28)  (-0.76)  - - (-1.31)  (-1.15)  (-3.16)  (-2.35)  -
2.  -1.32  0.42  -2.48  -0.47  - - -0.07  -0.09  -0.29  -0.17  - 0.23
(-0.48)  (1.52) (-1.82)  (-2.88)  (-0.73)  (-0.96)  (-2.07)  (-1.10)  -
3.  -2.37  0.48  -2.11  - -0.03  - -0.11  0.12  -0.34  -0.24  - 0.33
(-0.90)  (1.85)  (-1.50)  - (-2.77)  - (-1.25)  (-1.35)  (-2.48)  (-1.71)  -
4.  -2.38  0.51  -2.11  -0.39  - - -0.08  -0.10  -0.40  -0.21  0.81  0.48
(-1.09)  (2.34) (-1.33)  (-3.13)  - - (-1.05)  (-1.28)  (-4.16)  (-1.45)  (1.03)
5.  -3.40  0.57  -0.90  - -0.02  - -0.12  -0.13  -0.45  -0.34  0.22  0.4G
(-1.51)  (2.56) (-0.47)  - (-2.75)  - (-1.55)  (-1.63)  (-4.48)  (-2.09)  (0.24)
6.  -1.92  0.41  -2.19  - - -0.07  -0.10  -0.12  -0.30  -0.13  - 0.320 (-0.75)  (1.63) (-2.47)  - - (-3.35)  (-1.13)  (-1.29)  (-2.65)  (-1.05)  - 0'
7.  -2.80  0.55  -2.50  -0.39  - -0.06  -0.08  -0.10  -0.29  -0.10  - 0.31
(-1.10)  (2.17) (-2.95)  (-2.62)  - (-2.69)  (-0.86)  (-1.08)  (-2.57)  (-0.85)  -
S.  -3.61  0.60  -2.43  - -0.03  -0.06  -0.11  -0.12  -0.31  -0.15  - 0.34
(-1.42)  (2.38) (-2.83)  - (-2.69)  (-2.85)  (-1.24)  (-1.35)  (-2.81)  (-1.26)  -
9.  -3.45  0.62  -4.22  -0.32  - -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  -0.34  0.03  1.88  0.33
(-1.39)  (2.48) (-3.06)  (-2.24)  - (-3.20)  (-0.82)  (-1.03)  (-3.27) (0.18)  (2.67)
10.  -4.10  0.66  -4.20  - -0.02  -0.07  -0.10  -0.11  -0.35  -0.01  1.86  0.34
(-1.")  (2.63)  (-2.84)  - (-2.35)  (-3.39)  (-1.12)  (-1.24)  (-3.40)  (-0.05)  (2.49)
____......  ....  .*.  _____...  ....  _____....  .........  . ._...  . ..  ._..  .. _  . ._  . _..  . ...  ..... _  ...  ...  ._.  . .. _  ..  ... _  .Table 3-A
OLS  Estimates of  the  Remittanme  Function.  Level of  Remittances. Stock of  Population.  DM.
..................  .......................................  ....  ....  ..  _  _.......................  ........ OLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  tpop  lyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  D4  05  D6  DTI  R2
1.  -0.43  0.76  0.31  -0.75  - - - 0.44  -0.23  -0.00  0.30  - 0.92 (-0.19)  (3.08)  (1.37)  (-2.12)  - - - (4.40)  (-0.79)  (-0.00)  (2.45)  -
2.  -2.66  0.93  0.45  -0.77  -0.28  - - 0.43  -0.03  -0.18  0.26  - 0.92 (-1.11)  (3.75)  (2.02)  (-2.27)  (-2.36)  - - (4.46)  (-0.09)  (-0.67)  (2.15)  -
3.  -4.05  1.08  0.48  -0.76  - -0.02  - 0.36  0.13  -0.34  0.17  - 0.92 (-1.53)  (4.01) (2.11)  (-2.25)  - (-2.47)  (3.52)  (0.40)  (-1.18)  (1.35)  -
4.  -2.44  0.90  0.46  -1.46  -0.28  - - 0.45  -0.06  -0.14  0.31  0.58  0.93 (-1.03)  (3.69) (2.07) (-2.95)  (-2.43)  - - (4.69)  (-0.21)  (-0.55)  (2.59)  (1.88)  -
5.  -3.78  1.04  0.48  -1.45  - -0.02  - 0.38  0.09  -0.30  0.23  0.58  0.93 (-1.46)  (3.94)  (2.16)  (-2.93)  - (-2.45)  (3.74)  (0.28)  (-1.06)  (1.78)  (1.87)
6.  -2.30  0.67  0.55  -0.81  - - -0.07  0.46  -0.34  0.09  0.40  - 0.94 (-1.10)  (3.04)  (2.66)  (-2.58)  - - (-4.03)  i.16)  (-1.28)  (0.40)  (3.64)  -
7.  -3.64  0.80  0.63  -0.82  -0.19  - -0.06  0.45  -0.19  -0.04  0.37  - 0.94 (-1.65)  (3.49)  (3.01)  (-2.65)  (-1.73)  - (-3.61)  (5.13)  (-0.68)  (-0.15)  (3.27)  -
8.  -4.60  0.90  0.64  -0.81  - -0.01  -0.06  0.40  -0.08  -0.15  0.31  - 0.94 (-1.91)  (3.60)  (3.07)  (-2.63)  - (-1.83)  (-3.58)  (4.30)  (-0.27)  (-0.56)  (2.52)  -
9.  -3.44  0.75  0.64  -1.66  -0.18  - -0.07  0.47  -0.25  0.02  0.44  0.71  0.94 (-1.64)  (3.41)  (3.23)  (-3.77)  (-1.66)  - (-4.06)  (5.59)  (-0.93)  (0.07)  (3.99)  (2.57)
10.  -4.31  0.83  0.66  -1.65  - -0.01  -0.07  0.42  -0.15  -0.09  0.39  0.70  0.94 (-1.88)  (3.51)  (3.29)  (-3.75)  - (-1.75)  (-4.03)  (4.74)  (-0.52)  (-0.33)  (3.22)  (2.56)
...............................  -.......-.---...--.-.-.-.--------...--..-.---.--..-..----.-----.---.-----...------..---------------- 
- . _-Table 3-B
OLS  Estimates of  the  Remittance Function,  Per Capita Remittances. Stock of  Population.  DO.
OLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  D4  D5  D6  DT  R2
1.  -1.30  0.24  -0.66  - - 0.39  0.04  -0.24  0.22  - 0.52
(-0.61)  (1.11) (-1.94)  - - (4.68)  (0.53)  (-2.74)  (2.45)  -
2.  -2.96  0.44  -0.75  -0.29  - - 0.42  0.05  -0.25  0.23  - 0.56
(-1.39)  (2.03) (-2.28)  (-2.57)  - - (5.23) (-0.67)  (-2.93)  (2.74)  -
3.  -3.63  0.48  -0.78  - -0.02  - 0.38  0.04  -0.26  0.20  - 0.57
(-1.66)  (2.19) (-2.38)  - (-2.68)  - (4.81)  (0.50)  (-3.07)  (2.35)  -
4.  -2.89  0.44  -1.42  -0.29  - - 0.42  0.05  -0.25  0.28  0.57  0.58  1 (-1.39)  (2.05) (-2.95)  (-2.60)  - - (5.42)  (0.70)  (-2.96)  (3.20) (1.87)
5.  -3.57  0.48  -1.46  - -0.02  - 0.38  0.04  -0.26  0.24  0.58  0.59  OD (-1.66)  (2.22)  (-3.05)  - (-2.74)  - (5.00)  (0.53)  (-3.11)  (2.82)  (1.91)
6.  -3.40  0.45  -0.69  - - -0.07  Cv.38  -0.04  -0.24  0.29  - 0.61
(-1.72)  (2.26)  (-2.25)  - - (-3.86)  (5.18) (-0.57)  (-3.00)  (3.55)  -
7.  -4.47  0.58  -0.76  -0.23  - -0.06  0.41  0.05  -0.24  0.30  - 0.64
(-2.25)  (2.88)  (-2.52)  (-2.13)  - (-3.52)  (5.60)  (0.68)  (-3.15)  (3.71)  -
8.  -5.11  0.63  -0.79  - -0.02  -0.06  0.38  0.04  -0.25  0.27  - 0.64
(-2.51)  (3.06)  (-2.63)  - (-2.36)  (-3.60)  (5.28)  (0.54)  (-3.30)  (3.39)  -
9.  -4.48  0.59  -1.55  -0.22  - -0.06  0.42  0.05  -0.02  0.35  0.68  0.67
(-2.36)  (3.03)  (-3.59)  (-2.14)  - (-3.90)  (5.95)  (0.72)  (-3.25)  (4.42)  (2.47)
10.  -5.13  0.4  -1.59  - -0.02  -0.06  0.39  0.04  -0.25  0.33  0.69  0.67
(-2.63)  (3.24)  (-3.71)  - (-2.43)  (-3.99)  (5.65)  (0.58)  (-3.41)  (4.12)  (2.52)
, ..-..--  ..-....-........................--...--...-.........-......-...-.....-...----......--......---..........--.....---....-.....-----............-----.....--...--------.........-----------...........-- _-..Table 3-C
TSLS  Estimates  of  the  Remittance Function.  Level  of  Remittances. Stock of  Population.  DN.
TSLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lpop  tyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  04  D5  06  DT1  12
1.  1.21  0.55  0.28  -1.16  - - 0.51  -0.46  0.25  0.37  - 0.92 (0.36)  (1.38)  (1.20)  (-0.96)  - - - (4.19)  (-0.98)  (0.54)  (1.74)  -
2.  0.17  0.63  0.38  -1.84  -0.36  - . 0.55  -0.34  0.21  0.43  - 0.91 (0.05)  C1.58) (1.58) (-1.52)  (-2.67)  - (4.42)  (-0.72)  (0.46)  (2.00)
3.  -1.71  0.84  0.41  -1.78  - -0.03  - 0.45  -0.11  -0.02  0.31  - 0.92 (-0.47)  (2.04)  (1.68)  (-1.47)  - (-2.82)  - (3.60)  (-0.22)  (-0.04)  (1.44)  -
4.  -1.85  0.87  0.42  -1.25  -0.34  - - 0.49  -0.07  -0.11  0.30  0.45  0.93 (-0.66)  (2.71)  (1.94)  (-0.80)  (-2.79)  - - (4.67) (-0.17)  (-0.31)  (1.52)  (0.60)
5.  -3.52  1.06  0.44  -1.31  - -0.03  - 0.40  0.14  -0.31  0.21  0.48  0.93 (-1.18)  (3.12)  (2.04)  (-0.84)  - (-2.97)  (3.71)  (0.35)  (-0.84)  (1.01)  (0.64)
6.  1.73  0.17  0.49  -2.45  - - -0.07  0.60  -0.89  0.72  0.67  - 0.90 (0.53)  (0.(5)  (1.85)  (-2.58)  - - (-3.36)  (4.87) (-1.98) (1.68)  (3.41)  -
7.  0.33  0.35  0.55  -2.51  -0.27  - -0.06  0.60  -0.67  0.54  0.63  - 0.90 (0.10)  (0.92)  (2.08)  (-2.74)  (-1.87)  - (-2.87)  (4.94)  (-1.48)  (1.28)  (3.28)  -
8.  -0.92  0.49  0.56  -2.53  - -0.02  -0.06  0.53  -0.51  0.39  0.55  - 0.90 (-0.26)  (1.20)  (2.11)  (-2.68)  - (-1.91)  (-2.83)  (4.15) (-1.06) (0.85)  (2.70)  -
9.  -0.44  0.38  0.60  -4.38  -0.21  - -0.07  0.59  -0.62  0.47  0.76  1.95  0.90 (-0.14)  (1.04)  (2.31)  (-2.87)  (-1.46)  - (-3.35)  (4.97) (-1.42) (1.16)  (3.44) (2.58)
10.  -1.55  0.51  0.61  -4.30  - -0.02  *0.07  0.53  -0.48  0.33  0.68  1.92  0.91 (-0.47)  (1.30) (2.37) (-2.85)  - (-1.54)  (-3.33)  (4.28) (-1.04) (0.75)  (2.98) (2.57)
,...................................................................................................................................................................... 
.....  ...........  ..............Table 3-D
TSLS  Estimates of  the Remittance Function.  Per Capita Remittances. Stock of  Population.  D".
_.  ....  ....  ..  _....  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TSLS:  Length of  Stay
Equation  Constant  lyhost  prem  ratio  t  inf  D3  D4  D5  D6  OTI  12 . ..  ....  ........  ...........  . .......  ...........  . ....  .....  ....  ...  . ..................  ............. 1.  -1.27  0.23  -0.48  - 0.42  0.07  -0.25  0.19  - 0.53 (-0.50)  (0.92)  (-0.40)  - - - (4.83)  (0.84)  (-1.94)  (1.43)  -
2.  -1.63  0.33  -1.64  -0.40  - 0.48  0.10  -0.17  0.31  - 0.54 (-0.66)  (1.32) (-1.31)  (-2.93)  - - (5.39)  (1.12)  (-1.30)  (2.23)  -
3.  -2.56  0.39  -1.73  - -0.03  - 0.42  0.08  -0.18  0.26  - 0.54 (-1.03)  (1.58) (-1.30)  - (-2.97)  (4.89)  (0.89)  (-1.40)  (1.91)  -
4.  -2.47  0.40  -1.18  -0.35  - - 0.46  0.09  -0.24  0.26  0.44  0.61 (-1.14)  (1.85)  (-0.71)  (-3.00)  - - (5.74)  (1.13)  (-2.52)  (1.73) (0.53)
5.  -3.44  0.47  -0.69  - -0.02  - 0.41  0.07  -0.27  0.18  0.18  0.60 (-1.54)  (2.11)  (-0.37)  - (-2.94)  - (5.10)  (0.86)  (-2.75)  (1.00)  (0.20)
6.  -1.88  0.30  -1.90  - - -0.06  0.43  0.08  -0.14  0.38  - 0.51 (0.75)  (1.21)  (-2.21)  - - (-3.32)  (4.86)  (0.92)  (-1.23)  (3.22)  - o
7.  -2.66  0.43  -2.17  -0.35  - -0.05  0.47  0.10  -0.12  0.41  - 0.51  1 (-1.08)  (1.72) (-2.60)  (-2.58)  - (-2.74)  (5.27)  (1.09)  (-1.13)  (3.51)  -
8.  -3.61  0.49  -2.22  - -0.03  -0.05  0.42  0.08  -0.14  0.37  - 0.52 (-1.46)  (2.00)  (-2.65)  - (-2.91)  (-2.78)  (4.85)  (0.90)  (-1.30)  (3.22)
9.  -3.20  0.48  -4.02  -0.30  - -0.07  0.48  0.10  -0.16  0.55  1.86  0.49 (-1.30)  (1.95) (-2.81)  (-2.19)  - (-3.24)  (5.23)  (1.15)  (-1.56)  (3.70) (2.55)
10.  -4.05  0.55  -4.00  - -0.02  -0.07  0.43  0.09  -0.18  0.51  1.82  0.52 (-1.66)  (2.23)  (-2.76)  - (-2.60)  (-3.31)  (4.93)  (1.00)  (-1.74)  (3.44)  (2.48)- 41 -
Table  4
Heterosoedasticitv  Tests
Table  2.a  Models  Table  3.a  Models
rIK2  Sig.  Level  nR 2 Sig.  Level
1.  13.00  0.250  13.65  0.250
2.  13.65  0.375  15.60  0.250
3.  11.05  0.500  13.00  0.375
4.  19.50  0.100  25.35  0.025
5.  17.55  0.175  20.80  0.100
6.  21.45  0.050  20.80  0.075
7.  18.20  0.250  18.85  0.175
8.  17.55  0.250  16.90  0.250
9.  20.15  0.175  26.65  0.038
10.  20.15  0.175  22.75  0.100
Note:  (a)  The  test  is  a  panel  data  extension  of  White (1980),  and  is  based
on the  regression  of  the  squared  residuals  from  the  equations  of
tables  (2)  and (3)  on the  moments  of the independent  variables
(see  footnote  13).- 42 -
Table 5
Endoceneity Tests
Stock of Workers  Stock of Population
Based Models  Based Models
Test  Sig. Level  Test  Sig. Level
A. Hndoaeneitv of Premium Only
1.  -0.72  0.48  0.37  0.71
2.  -1.27  0.21  1.01  0.32
3.  -1.32  0.19  0.95  0.35
4.  -0.36  0.72  -0.12  0.91
5.  -0.20  0.85  -0.07  0.94
6.  -2.46  0.02  2.60  0.01
7.  -2.57  0.01  2.72  0.01
8.  -2.69  0.01  2.69  0.01
9.  -2.57  0.01  2.72  0.01
10.  -2.54  0.01  2.65  0.01
B.  EndaQgeneity  of Inflation  given that of the Premiu
9.  0.64  0.53  1.01  0.32
10.  0.73  0.47  1.06
Note:  This is a Hausman type test and is based on comparing the OLS model with
a TS model where inflation and the premium are endogenous, (see  footnotes
15 and 16).- 43  -
Table 6
Elasticity of Real Remittances Relative to Its Determinants
Stock of Workers  Stock of Population
Based Model  Based Model
(Eq. 2-D-9)  (Eq.  3-D-9)
independent Variable
Demoaraohic & Income Factors:
1.  Stock of Migrant Workers
(population)  1.00  1.00
2.  Length of Stay  -0.43  -0.40
3.  Real Income in Host Countries  0.62  0.48
Macroeconomic Policy Factors:
4.  Black Market Exchange  -0.34  -0.32
Rate Premium
S.  Domestic Inflation  -0.03  -0.03
6.  Shift Country Specific
Effects Relative to
Morocco:
Portugal  -NS  0.48
Tunisia  -NS  +NS
Turkey  -0.34  -NS
Yugoslavia  +NS  0.55
7.  Special Turkish Premium
Interest Rate Policy  1.88  1.86
Source:  Equation  (9)  of tables (2-D) and (3-D).
Notes:  a.  For (2), (4) and (5) the elasticities are derived by multiplying
the  regression  coefficients with  the  corresponding  historical
averages of the inlependent variable.
b.  NS means statistically not significant.
c.  The estimated coefficients for (6)  and (7)  are semi-elasticities.- 44  -
Appendix
Data Sources  and Construction
Remittances  (Rem) were defined as the sum of labor income and
workers' remittances  proper.  Thus,  we  did not make the distinction  of
remittances  from  workers  living  abroad  for  less  than  one  year or  more than  one
year (the  criterion  adopted  in  the system  of national  accounts). The  raw  data
were obtained from country sources,  mostly central  bank bulletins  of labor
exporting  countries.  In the case  of Portugal,  only remittances  from  Western
European  countries  were considered. Therefore,  the large  flow of remittances
from  North  America  (mostly  Canada)  was excluded. We followed  this  procedure  to
achieve  consistency  between  the flow  of remittances  and the stock  of migrant
workers. It  was  essential  to  obtain  a  breakdown  of  total  remittances  to Portugal
by origin  (Western  Europe  and  other  origins),  as Portugal  seems  to have  a large
stock  of  migrant  workers  outside  Western  Europe. For  the  other  countries  in  the
sample it was not possible  to obtain  a breakdown  of remittances  by origin.
Therefore,  some inconsistencies  remain  between  the information  on the flow  of
remittances  and the stocks  of migrant labor and population.  However, the
measurement  errors implied by these inconsistencies  seem to be minor, as
migration  outside  Western  Europe  looks  small  in  comparison  with  total  migration.
The flows  of remittances  were expressed  in real German  Marks by
multiplying  the  original  currency  of  denomination--either  the  domestic  currency
or the  US  dollar--by  the  yearly  average  exchange  rate  of  the  German  Mark  vls-a-
vls  the  currency  of  denomination,  and  dividing  the  result  by the  yearly  average- 45 -
German CPI.  The exchange rates and CPIs were obtained from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS)  of the IMF.
Stock  of  workers  abroad  (Work)  was  obtained  from  the  OECD's
continuous reporting system on migration  (SOPEMI).
Stock of  total  population abroad (Pop)  was also  obtained from  SOPEMI,
OECD.  However, there were a number of gaps in  the series.  For instance, in the
case of France, the data is reported every five years; for Belgium, the data is
only reported from 1982 and  onwards; and data concerning Portuguese and Tunisian
nationals  in  the  Netherlands  is  only  available  from  1982.  The  missing
observations  were  estimated  by  calculating  the  ratio  of  workers  to  total
population in the years where both series were available, estimating the ratio
between the two data points by making a linear interpolation, and dividing the
stock of workers by the estimated ratio.
Length of stay (Length)  was alternatively proxied by a simple linear
time trend (t) and by the ratio (ratio) of the actual stock of migrant workers
(total migrant  population) to  a  discounted stock  of migrant workers  (total
migrant population).  Thus, in the case of workers, the ratio was defined by
Wt/Wat,  where Wt and Wat  are  the actual and discounted stocks of migrant workers,
respectively.  Wat  was constructed bys
WC'WO. e 4cE  .1  (w0-W*.1) . e-6
where Wo is the stock of workers in the base year (1977) and 6  is the discount
rate.  The procedure simply consists of discounting less the  more recent changes- 46 -
in  the  stock  of  migrant  workers. In  the  extreme  case  where  the  stock  of  migrant
workers  is constant,  the summation  term is zero  an:-  the adjusted  stock  at t Ls
simply  the  stock  in  the  base  year  discounted  by 8t.  The  summation  term  will  be
larger  in  the  cases  where  migration  is  a  recent  phenomenon.  Therefore,  the  ratio
Wt/Wat  is higher (lower)  the longer (shorter)  the average length  of stay of
workers  abroad.
Host  country  per  capita  income  (Yhost)  was  calculated  for each
sending country as the weighted average of per capita income in the host
countries. The shares  of migrant  workers  in each of the seven  host  countries
were  used  as  weights. All  values  were  converted  into  real  German  Marks (DM)  by
using  the  yearly  average  nominal  exchange  rates  in  the  given  year  and  the  yearly
average  German  CPI. For  example,  host  country  per  capita  income  for  Algeria  at
time  t is defined  as;
ThOStos,  t  ( YAusL.ria,.  E  g  a,,  ( YBe.Zgi  mO.  E)/P  )  . +  YFraice 1 . E,P¢)
+(YGermanyI/PD)  A, G,+  (1TNetherlandst.  ED/Pot) .A.M+  (YSwedent.  ESJ/P)  .a  GSW,
+ (YSwi  tzerland.  *  /Pt)
where YhostA  is host country  per capita  income  for Algeria,  YAustria  is per
capita  income  in Austria  in Austrian  Schillings,  EDMAS  is the nominal  exchange
rate of the German  Mark vis-a-vls  the Austrian  Schilling,  pG  is the average
yearly  CPI in Germany,  aAUAS is the  share  of  Algerian  workers  in  Austria  in  the
total  stock  of Algerian  workers  abroad,  and  the  t subscript  is  the  time  period.
All the  other  subscripts  were  defined  similarly. Per  capita  income  in  the  host
countries  were obtained  from  the  World  Bank  data  base.- 47 -
Black  market  premium  (Prom)  was  defined  as  the  percentage  difference
between  the  average  yearly  exchange  rates  of  the  domestic  currency  vis-a-vis  the
German  Mark in  the  official  and  parallel  markets. The  official  exchange  rates
were obtained  from  the IFS,  whereas  the  exchange  rates  in the parallel  market
were obtained  from  Pick's  Currency  Yearbook.
Inflation  was  defined  as  percentage  variations  the  yearly  average  CPI
obtained  from  the International  Financial  Statistics  of the  IMF.
Interest  rate  differentials  for  each  sending  country  were  calculated
as  the  weighted  average  of  bilateral,  depreciation-adjusted  interest
differentials  on  the  yearly  averages  of  3-6  month  deposits.  The  shares  of  workers
in each host country were again used as weights.  Each bilateral interest
differential  was  defined  as:
(d(1+)  _-1
(l.Lt)  (l.1t)
where  Et  is  the  depreciation  of the  nominal  bilateral  exchange  rate  between  t-l
and t, it  is the domestic  interest  rate at t, and i*t  is  the foreign  interest
rate at t.  The interest  rates  on deposits  in  the home  countries  were  obtained
from  central  bank  reports  and  the interest  rates  on deposits  in  host  countries
were obtained  from  the IFS.Appendix Table  1
Algeria:  Selected  Economic and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
1.  Remittances  (USS  millions)  192.3  162.0  164.1  184.7  169.1  274.5  300.4  170.6  149.9  132.0  208.6  351.8  278.9  268.0
2.  Per  Capita  Remittances  (USS thousands)
2.1  Per National  Abroad  0.19  0.20  0.23  0.20  0.33  0.37  0.21  0.18  0.16  0.26  0.47  0.35  0.34
2.2  Per Worker Abroad  0.51  0.52  0.59  0.54  0.92  1.03  0.57  0.50  0.46  0.75  1.38  1.02  1.01
3.  National  Abroad  (thousands)  845.5  835.6  799.4  845.3  833.8  821.1  825.9  830.8  836.2  814.3  749.2  806.3  776.8  >
4.  Workers Abroad  (USS thousands)  317.7  314.8  314.5  313.7  298.7  291.5  297.1  302.4  284.3  277.1  255.0  274.6  264.8  1
5.  Host  Country  Per Capita  Income (USS)  7544  8439  10022  11881  12428  11887  10618  9931  9738  10785  12951  16193  17846
6.  Black  Market  Premium (X)  74.6  112.5  119.0  131.5  181.9  215.5  249.4  259.8  333.8  390.4  348.0  386.2  396.0  386.2
7.  Domestic  Inflation  (X)  12.1  17.2  11.5  9.5  14.6  6.7  7.8  6.3  10.5  12.4  7.4  5.9  9.3Appendix  Table  2
Morocco:  Setected  Economic and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
1.  Remittances  (US# millions)  503.8  540.7  710.2  885.1  985.0  948.5  802.4  878.4  838.1  940.5  1380.7  1571.7  1287.2  1322.5
2.  Per  Capita  Remittances  (USS thousands)
2.1  Per  National  Abroad  1.12  1.40  1.62  1.67  1.50  1.15  1.20  1.09  1.17  1.75  1.95  1.56  1.53
2.2  Per  Worker Abroad  2.55  3.67  4.59  4.73  4.53  3.56  3.79  3.29  3.45  5.21  5.86  4.74  4.64
3.  National Abroad CUSS  thousands)  481.2  509.0  547.7  588.3  634.0  700.5  733.1  766.1  803.9  790.9  806.0  825.1  866.2  4
4.  Workers Abroad  (USS  thousands)  211.9  193.6  192.6  208.3  209.6  225.3  231.8  255.0  272.3  265.2  268.1  271.6  285.0  1
5.  Host  Country  Per  Capita  Income (USS)  7610  8597  10246  12020  12281  11566  10367  9749  9537  10502  12608  15826  17511
6.  Black Market  Premium CZ)  5.3  5.8  9.4  11.9  4.5  2.8  6.3  4.9  3.7  0.8  1.0  3.3  3.4  9.2
7.  Domestic  Inflation  (X)  12.6  9.7  8.3  9.4  12.5  10.5  6.2  12.4  7.7  8.7  2.7  2.4  3.1
---  - . - . ---  --  --  --  . --  - . -.-  - _  --  --  ---  --  --  -.-  --  --  ---  - _  -_-  _  --  . --  . - - . ---  - --  --  _  --  --  ---  --  - _  - -_-  --  --  ---  - _  - ---  --  _  - --Appendix  Table  3
Portugal:  Selected  Economic and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
1.  Remittances  (USS  millions)  766.8  1003.7  1387.3  1986.0  2245.4  1983.9  1751.4  1523.2  1521.6  1457.3  1887.8  2468.3  2576.2  2731.6
2.  Per  Capita  Remittences  (USS thousands)
2.1  Per  National  Abroad  1.10  1.53  2.20  2.50  2.20  1.93  1.69  1.73  1.66  2.34  3.11  3.21  3.23 2.2  Per  Worker  Abroad  2.08  2.76  3.93  4.73  4.22  3.64  2.95  2.87  2.77  3.90  5.19  5.30  5.31
3.  National  Abroad  (USSthousands)  912.8  906.4  902.9  899.4  901.1  907.5  899.1  881.7  876.7  805.4  793.9  801.7  846.8
4.  Workers Abroad  (USS thousands)  482.0  502.6  505.5  474.6  469.7  481.5  515.5  530.7  526.6  484.1  476.0  486.3  514.8
5.  Host  Country  Per  Capita  Income  (USS)  7658  8597  10250  12147  12623  12038  10838  10217  10073  11240  13603  17218  19094
6. Black  Market  Premium  (X)  12.7  11.2  7.8  2.4  2.8  4.8  6.0  15.3  2.8  -0.2  0.5  10.3  15.0  1.6
27.1  6.7  27.1  14.7  20.0  22.7  25.1  28.9  19.3  11.7  9.4  9.6  12.6 7.  Domestic  Inflation  (t)Appendix Table  4
Tunisia:  Selected  Economic and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
1.  Remittances  (USS mitlions)  132.9  156.6  206.2  269.4  289.1  348.7  360.1  349.9  306.1  259.6  351.8  479.3  538.5  489.8
2.  Per  Capita  Remittanrces (USS thousands)
2.1  Per  National  Abroad  0.86  1.10  1.39  1.48  1.68  1.60  1.52  1.32  1.11  1.54  2.12  2.15  2.06 2.2  Per  worker  Abroad  1.71  2.24  3.38  3.75  4.07  4.00  3.68  3.14  2.78  3.87  5.31  5.44  5.15
3.  National  Abroad  (USS  thousands)  182.9  188.1  194.3  194.9  207.0  225.6  229.5  231.7  234.4  227.8  225.8  250.2  238.3
4.  Workers  Abroad (USS  thousands)  91.4  92.0  79.6  77.1  85.7  90.0  95.0  97.4  93.4  90.9  90.3  99.0  95.1
5.  Host  Country  Per  Capita  Income (USS)  7622  8564  10250  12113  12510  11864  10656  10025  9820  10854  13043  16332  18070
6.  Black  Market  Premimn C%)  12.4  1.4  4.8  2.8  10.2  0.6  7.3  8.5  13.2  5.9  4.6  1.5  6.4  2.1
7.  Domestic  Inflation  <X)  6.7  5.3  45.3  14.1  8.9  13.7  8.9  8.4  8.0  5.8  7.2  6.4  7.4 ..  ....  -....  .---..---....-....---  . .--  ..---.-  ..------.  ---.---..---.--  ..-  .--...-  ..--..----------------...--------  .---..-..-----------...--------.....-..------.  .-..  --..  -----Appendix Table  5
Turkey:  Selected  Economic and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
1. Remittances  (USS millions)  982.0 1090.0  1132.0  1657.0  2137.2  2645.2  2453.6  2046.1  2502.4  1991.7  1932.0  2624.5  2333.2  3391.0
2.  Per  Capita  Remittances  (USS thousands)
2.1  Per National  Abroad  0.76  0.75  1.02  1.15  1.33  1.19  1.00  1.30  1.04  0.99  1.26  1.08  1.48 2.2  Per  Worker  Abroad  1.71  1.71  2.36  2.79  3.29  3.01  2.54  3.32  2.63  2.50  3.23  2.78  3.88
3.  National  Abroad  (US#thousands)  1434.8 1499.5 1622.0 1862.9 1990.1  2061.0 2042.3 1929.2 1918.7 1946.7  2079.3 2154.4  2291.1
4.  Workers  Abroad (USS thousands)  638.2  661.9  701.6  766.5  805.1  814.8  806.8  754.1  758.2  m7.8  812.9  837.8  873.1
5.  Host  Couintry  Per  Capita  Income  (USS)  8154  9381  11378  13188  13161  12204  11356  11076  10831  11835  14166  18093  20066
6. Black  Market  Premium  (X)  9.8  16.9  21.1  56.4  6.9  9.9  11.3  12.8  0.9  -2.8  -2.i  9.4  14.7  2.1
7.  Domestic  Inflation  (X)  27.1  45.3  58.7  20.7  36.6  30.8  31.4  48.4  45.0  34.6  38.8  75.4  69.6
. _  ...-  - . - - . - - - - --  - - --  - - - --  - - --  - - - --  . - - . - - . . - - - - - - - . - - --  - - --  - - - --  - - --  - - - --  - - --  - - - --  - - -Appendix Table  6
Yugoslavia:  Selected  Economic  and Demographic Indicators,  1977-89
........  .............  .............................................................................................  ............................................................................................................................................
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,.....  ........  ...........................................................................................  ....................................................................................................................... 
1.  Remittances  (USS millions)  17m7.0  1732.0  2034.0  2055.0  1902.0  2428.0  1668.0  1639.0  1729.0  1586.0  1566.0  934.0  1438.0  1452.0
2.  Per Capita  Remittances  (USS thousands)
2.1  Per National  Abroad  1.70  2.09  2.10  1.90  2.41  1.70  1.72  1.85  1.71  1.69  0.98  1.54  1.47
2.2  Per worker  Abroad  2.94  3.51  3.59  3.37  4.33  3.06  3.07  3.28  3.00  2.99  1.75  2.66  2.62
3.  National  Abroad CUSSthousands)  1018.1  971.4  976.4  999.8  1006.5  983.7  951.7  933.8  928.7  927.0  949.8  932.1  989.5  an
4.  Workers Abroad (USS thousands)  588.9  580.1  573.0  564.1  560.2  545.3  533.7  527.8  528.3  523.0  534.1  541.1  555.1
5.  Host Country  Per Capita  Income (USS)  7889  9062  11018  12823  12921  12194  11431  11212  11055  12144  14641  18838  21018
6.  Black  Market Premium  (X)  5.0  5.5  6.2  8.6  10.7  14.4  18.7  13.1  8.0  6.3  15.3  23.7  15.0  6.0
14.7  14.1  20.7  30.9  39.8  31.5  40.2  54.7  72.3  89.8  120.8  194.1  1239.9
7.  Domestic  Inflation  (X)
....  ....  .....  ........  ...........................  .........................................................  ........................  ..........................................  ............. - 54 -
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